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Abstract
By allocating dierent information to team members, secret contracts can
provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design.
For instance, they may help to monitor monitors, and attain approximately
ecient partnerships by appointing a secret principal. More generally, secret
contracts highlight a rich duality between enforceability and identiability. It
naturally yields necessary and sucient conditions on a monitoring technology
for any team using linear transfers to approximate eciency (with and without
budget balance). The duality is far-reaching: it is robust to complications in
the basic model such as environments with limited liability and participation
constraints.
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1 Introduction
Ann owns a restaurant. She hires Bob to tally up the till every night and report
back any mismatch between the till and that night's bills. Ann can motivate Bob to
exert such eort and report truthfully any mismatch by secretly taking some money
from the till herself with positive probability and oering him the following incentive
scheme: if Ann took some money, she will pay Bob his wage only when he reports a
mismatch; if Ann did not take any money, she will pay Bob only when a mismatch
is not reported.
Bob faces a secret contract: his report-contingent wage is unknown to him a priori
(it depends on whether or not Ann secretly took some money). If Bob fails to exert
eort, he won't know what to report in order to secure his wage. However, if he does
his job he'll discover whether or not there is a mismatch and deduce from this Ann's
behavior. Only after tallying the till will Bob know what to report in order to receive
his wage, which turns out to be optimally truthful.
This paper studies contracts like Bob's and how they might help organizations to
function productively. By allocating dierent information to team members, secret
contracts often provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational
design. Thus, they give Bob incentives to acquire costly information and reveal it. In
general, they provide a way of \monitoring the monitor" (Section 2.1), and can yield
approximately ecient partnerships by appointing a \secret principal" (Section 2.2).
A rich duality between enforceability and identiability|more specically, between
incentive compatible contracts and indistinguishable deviation plans|is exploited. It
leads us to identify teams that can approximate eciency (with and without budget-
balanced transfers) by means of their \monitoring technology" (Section 3). This
duality is far-reaching: it is amenable to complications in the basic model such as
individual rationality and limited liability (Section 4).
11.1 Monitors and Principals
According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 778, their footnote), [t]wo key demands
are placed on an economic organization|metering input productivity and metering
rewards.1 At the heart of their \metering problem" lies the question of how to give
incentives to monitors, which they answered by making the monitor residual claimant.
However, this can leave the monitor with incentives to misreport input productivity if
his report in
uences input rewards, like workers' wages, since|given eorts|paying
workers hurts him directly.2
On the other hand, Holmstr om (1982, p. 325) argues that ::: the principal's role
is not essentially one of monitoring ::: the principal's primary role is to break the
budget-balance constraint. Where Alchian and Demsetz seem to overemphasize the
role of monitoring in organizations, Holmstr om seems to underemphasize it. He
provides incentives with \team punishments" that reward all agents when output is
good and punish them all when it is bad. Assuming that output is publicly veriable,
he nds little role for monitoring,3 and perhaps as a result Holmstr om (1982, p. 339)
concludes wondering: ::: how should output be shared so as to provide all members
of the organization (including monitors) with the best incentives to perform?
Secret contracts motivate monitors: If the principal secretly recommends a worker
to shirk or work, both with some probability (the worker can easily be motivated to
willingly obey recommendations), and pays the monitor only if he reports back the
recommendation, then|like Bob|the monitor will prefer to exert eort and report
truthfully. To implement such contracts, the team requires (i) a disinterested media-
tor or machine that makes condential, veriable but non-binding recommendations
to players, and (ii) transfers that depend on the mediator's recommendation as well as
the monitor's report. As this requirement suggests, incentive compatibility of secret
contracts is described here by Myerson's (1986) communication equilibrium.
1Meter means to measure and also to apportion. One can meter (measure) output and one can
also meter (control) the output. We use the word to denote both; the context should indicate which.
2A comparable argument was put forward by Strausz (1997) by observing that delegated moni-
toring dominates monitoring by a principal who cannot commit to his agent that he will verify the
agent's eort when it is only privately veriable. However, Strausz assumes that monitoring signals
are \hard evidence," so a monitor cannot misreport his information.
3Intuitively, if output were not publicly veriable then his team punishments would no longer
provide the right incentives: monitors would always report good output to secure payment and shirk
from their monitoring responsibilities to save on eort. Knowing this, workers would also shirk.
2Monitoring adds value only insofar as it helps to provide incentives. Heuristically,
if monitors never monitor then workers will not work, so costly monitoring may be
worthwhile. Nevertheless, it is cost-ecient to do so as little as necessary. This leads
naturally to approximate eciency as the appropriate optimality criterion for a team
with costly monitoring, especially when having access to linear transfers. For exam-
ple, secret (mixed) monitoring of workers with small but positive probability together
with large punishments if caught shirking saves costs while providing incentives.
This use of mixed strategies to approximate eciency was developed by Legros and
Matthews (1993) in Nash equilibrium with public, deterministic output. Not only
can secret contracts exploit such mixing, too, but also (and in addition to monitoring
the monitor) they can improve a team's contractual prospects even in the restricted
setting of publicly veriable output, as the secret principal demonstrates.
To see this, recall the partnership problem of Radner et al. (1986). It shows that no
budget-balanced linear transfers contingent only on output can approximate eciency
in a team whose members can either work or shirk and whose joint output is (publicly
veriable and) either high or low with a probability that is increasing only in the
number of workers. A secret principal approximates eciency: With arbitrarily large
probability, suppose everyone is recommended to work, and paid nothing regardless.
With complementary probability, everybody is told to work except for one randomly
picked team member, who is secretly told to shirk. This individual must pay everyone
else if output is high and be paid by everyone else if output is low. Such a scheme is
incentive compatible with large payments, budget-balanced, approximately ecient.
1.2 Enforceability and Identiability
Assuming correlated equilibrium and approximate eciency/enforceability renders
linear our formal description of incentive compatible contracts. In other words, some
given team behavior is approximately implementable with incentive compatible secret
transfers if and only if a certain family of linear inequalities is satised. A duality
theory of contracts therefore obtains as a result of this linearity, with basic implica-
tions for understanding incentives. We take advantage of this duality throughout the
paper, which prevails over gradual complications in our basic model. Technically, our
linear methods rely on Rahman (2005a) to extend those of Nau and McCardle (1990)
and d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998) with substantially stronger results.
3Duality yields two sides of the same coin, two opposite views of the same problem|in
our case, a metering problem. As the title of this subsection|taken from Fudenberg
et al. (1994, p. 1013)|suggests, enforceable contracts and unidentiable deviation
plans are mutually dual variables. As such, two natural descriptions of a team's mon-
itoring technology emerge from each point of view. The primal side of the coin de-
scribes when contracts are approximately enforceable, whereas the dual side describes
when deviation plans cannot be identied. Thus, the smaller the set of unidentiable
deviation plans, the larger the set of enforceable contracts|like a cone and its polar.
In the limit, our main results (Theorems 1 and 3) provide intuitive conditions on a
monitoring technology that are necessary and sucient for any team outcome to be
approximately enforceable via secret contracts (with and without budget balance).
Theorem 1 provides a minimal requirement on a team's monitoring technology, called
detecting unilateral disobedience (DUD), that characterizes approximate enforceabil-
ity with secret contracts of any team outcome. Intuitively, for every disobedient
deviation plan there must be some correlated strategy (not necessarily the same one
for every plan) that renders the disobedience statistically detectable. (Dishonesty
may remain undetectable, though.) DUD turns out to be weak and generic.4
Restricting attention to budget-balanced secret contracts, Theorem 3 characterizes
approximate enforceability of team behavior with a stronger condition, called identi-
fying obedient players (IOP). Intuitively, IOP requires that|in addition to DUD|it
is possible to statistically identify some player as obedient upon any disobedience.
IOP is weak5 and generic,6 too. Intuitively, IOP delivers incentives with budget
balance by rewarding those known to be \innocent" while punishing all others.
Our use of duality facilitates the study of other restrictions to the metering problem,
like limited liability and individual rationality. Well-known results, such as that only
total liability matters when providing a team with incentives or that reasonably low
participation constraints don't bind even with budget balance, are extended to this
framework without complications. Exact implementation ts relatively nicely, too.
4DUD is weaker than comparable conditions in Compte (1998) and Obara (2005). Restricted to
public monitoring, DUD is weaker than local individual full rank, of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet
(1998), which in turn is weaker than the condition in Legros and Matsushima (1991).
5IOP is weaker than comparable conditions such as those in Kandori and Matsushima (1998),
Aoyagi (2005), and Tomala (2005). With public monitoring, it is still weaker than the compatibility
of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998) and even Kandori's (2003) version of pairwise full rank.
6Like DUD, IOP is \as generic if not more" than other conditions in the literature (Section ??).
4Further discussion of secret contracts, particularly as regards the theory of mechanism
design and their susceptibility to collusion, is deferred to the conclusion (Section 5).
2 Examples
We begin our formal analysis of secret contracts with two important, motivating
examples mentioned in the introduction: monitoring the monitor, and the secret
principal. The rst example studies an environment involving contractual variations
on a three-player game that attempts to typify the strategic interaction between a
principal, an agent, and a monitor. The second example nds an intuitive way of
attaining approximately ecient partnership with budget-balanced contracts.
2.1 Robinson and Friday
There are three players. The rst is Robinson, who can either monitor or shirk.
The second is Friday, who can either work or shirk. The third player is a so-called
mediating principal, a disinterested party who makes recommendations and enforces
contingent contractual payments. For simplicity, suppose the principal's utility is
constant regardless of the outcome of the game. Robinson (the row player) and
Friday (the column player) interact according to the left bi-matrix below.
work shirk work shirk
monitor 2; 1  1;0 monitor 1;0 0;1
shirk 3; 1 0;0 shirk 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
The action prole (shirk,work) is Pareto ecient, since Robinson nds monitoring
costly and it does not intrinsically add value. However, this strategy prole is not
incentive compatible by itself, since Friday always prefers to shirk rather than work.
The team's monitoring technology is given by a set S = fg;bg|so there are only
two possible signals contingent upon which contracts may be written|together with
the conditional probability system given by the right bi-matrix above. In words, if
Robinson shirks then both signals are equiprobable, whereas if he monitors then the
realized signal will accurately identify whether or not Friday worked. Contractual
5payments are assumed to be denominated in a private good (\money") that enters
players' utility linearly with unit marginal utility.
Clearly, the ecient strategy prole (shirk,work) cannot be implemented.7 However,
we can get arbitrarily close: When signals are publicly veriable, the correlated strat-
egy8 [(monitor,work)]+(1  )[(shirk,work)] can be implemented for any  2 (0;1]
with Holmstr om's team punishments. For example, paying Robinson $2 and Friday
$1= if g and both players zero if b makes (shirk,work) approximately implementable.
If only Robinson observes the signal, and it is not veriable, then for the principal to
write signal-contingent contracts, he must rst solicit the realizations from Robinson,
who may in principle misreport them. Notice that now team punishments break down,
since not only will Robinson always report g and shirk, but also Friday will shirk.
Furthermore, if Robinson was rewarded independently of his report then although he
would happily tell the truth, he would nd no reason to monitor.
Another possibility is to have Friday mix between working and shirking. On its own,
this strategy doesn't change Robinson's incentives to either lie or shirk. However, if
the principal and Friday correlate their play without Robinson knowing when, it is
possible to \cross-check" Robinson's report, thereby \monitoring the monitor."
Specically, the following correlated strategy is incentive compatible given  2 (0;1):
(i) Robinson is told to monitor with probability  (and shirk with probability 1 ),
(ii) Friday is independently told to work with probability  (to shirk with 1 ), and
(iii) the principal correlates his contractual strategy with players' recommendations:
(monitor,work) (monitor,shirk) (shirk,work) (shirk,shirk)
g 1=;1= 0;0 0;0 0;0
b 0;0 1=(1   );0 0;0 0;0
The numbers on the left are Robinson's contingent payments, and those on the right
are Friday's. Thus, Robinson is paid $1= if he reports g when (monitor,work) was
recommended and $1=(1 ) if he reports b when (monitor,shirk) was recommended.
It is easily seen that honesty and obedience to the mediator is incentive compatible.
This contract approximately implements (shirk,work) by letting  ! 0 and  ! 1.
7If Robinson shirks then no signal-contingent contract can compensate Friday more when working
than shirking, since each signal carries the same probability regardless of Friday's eort.
8As a matter of notation, let [a] stand for Dirac measure (or the pure strategy prole a living in
the space of correlated strategies) for any action prole a.
6Particularly distinguishing properties of this contract are that Robinson does not di-
rectly observe the principal's recommendation to Friday, and that Robinson has the
incentive to monitor inasmuch as he is rewarded for reporting accuracy. Notice also
that Robinson's report only conrms to the principal his recommendation to Friday.
As such, the principal strips away Robinson's a priori informational advantage, which
is why his surplus can be extracted. The principal allocates private information to
approximate eciency, so a team without asymmetric information may prefer to cre-
ate some as part of its organizational design. A salient problem of the contract is not
being robust to \collusion:" If Friday told Robinson his recommendation then both
players could save on eort. We do not address collusion formally in this paper, but
see Section 5.3 for a way to dissuade extra-contractual communication. On the other
hand, there is no other way for Friday to work with positive probability|not without
secrets. Finally, it is impossible to approximate eciency with budget balance, but
a reasonably dierent monitoring technology permits budget balanced approximate
eciency (Example 3) only with secret contracts, robust to this collusion.
2.2 Secret Principal
A team has n individuals. Each team member i can either work (ai = 1) or shirk
(ai = 0). Let c > 0 be each individual's cost of eort. Eort is not observable.
Output is publicly veriable and can be either good (g) or bad (b). The probability
of g equals P(
P
i ai), where P is a strictly increasing function of the sum of eorts.
Radner et al. (1986) showed that in this environment there do not exist budget-
balanced output-contingent linear transfers to induce everyone to work, not even
approximately. One arrangement that is not approximately ecient but nevertheless
induces most people to work is appointing Holmstr om's principal. Call this player 1
and dene transfers as follows. For i = 2;:::;n let i(g) = k and i(b) = 0 be player





By construction, the budget is balanced. Everyone but player 1 will work if k is
suciently large. However, player 1 has the incentive to shirk. This contract follows
Holmstr om's suggestion to the letter: Player 1 is a \xed" principal who absorbs the
incentive payments to all others by \breaking" everyone else's budget constraint.
7Allowing now for secret contracts, consider the following scheme. For any small " > 0,
a mediator asks every individual to work (call this event 1) with probability 1   ".
With probability ", he picks some player i at random (with probability "=n for all
i) and asks him secretly to shirk, while telling all others to work (call this event
1 i). For i = 1;:::;n let i(gj1) = i(bj1) = 0 be player i's contingent transfer if the
mediator asked everyone to work. Otherwise, if player i was secretly told to shirk,





Clearly, this contract is budget-balanced. It is also incentive compatible. Indeed, if
player i is recommended to work, incentive compatibility requires that
"(n   1)
n




which is satised if k is suciently large. If player i is asked to shirk, we require
 (n   1)P(n   1)k   (n   1)P(n)k   c;
which always holds.
Therefore, this contract implements the ecient outcome with probability 1   " and
a slightly inecient outcome with probability ". Since " can be made arbitrarily
small (by choosing an appropriate reward k), we obtain an approximately ecient
partnership. The role of principal is not xed here. It is randomly assigned with very
small probability to make negligible the loss from having a principal.
83 Model
Let I = f1;:::;ng be a nite set of players, Ai a nite set of actions available
to player i 2 I, and A =
Q
i Ai the (nonempty) space of action proles. Actions
are neither veriable nor directly observable. A correlated strategy is a probability
measure  2 (A). Let vi(a) be the utility to player i 2 I from action prole a 2 A.
Let Si be a nite set of private signals observable only by individual member i 2 I





be the (nonempty) product space of all observable signals. A monitoring technology
is a measure-valued map Pr : A ! (S), where Pr(sja) stands for the conditional
probability that s = (s0;s1;:::;sn) 2 S was observed given that the team played
a = (a1;:::;an) 2 A. For every s 2 S, suppose Pr(sja) > 0 for some a 2 A.
Assume that the team has access to linear transfers. An incentive scheme is any
map  : I  A  S ! R that assigns monetary transfers contingent on individuals,
recommended actions, and reported signals. It is assumed that recommendations are
veriable.9 Rather than focus on incentive schemes , we will also study probability
weighted transfers,  : IAS ! R. For any recommendation a 2 A with (a) > 0,
one may think of  as solving i(a;s) = (a)i(a;s) for some . For any a 2 A with
(a) = 0 and (a) 6= 0, one may think of  as either arising from unbounded incentive
schemes (i.e., i(a;s) = 1) or as the limit of a sequence fmmg. This change of
variables from  to  is explained further in Section 4.1.
The timing of team members' interaction runs as follows. Firstly, players agree upon
some contract (;) consisting of a correlated strategy  and an incentive scheme
. A prole of recommendations is drawn according to  and made to players con-
dentially and veriably by some machine. Players then simultaneously take some
action. Afterwards, they observe their private signals and submit a veriable report
of their observations (given by an element of their personal signal space) before ob-
serving the public signal (not essential, just simplifying). Finally, recommendation-
and report-contingent transfers are made according to .
9This assumption is without loss of generality: If recommendations were not directly veriable,
then players could be asked to announce theirs as veriable messages.
9If every player obeys his recommendation and reports truthfully, the expected utility







Of course, Mr. i may disobey his recommendation ai to play some other action bi and
lie about his privately observed signal. A reporting strategy is a map i : Si ! Si,
where i(si) is the reported signal when Mr. i privately observes si. Let Ri be the
set of all reporting strategies for player i. The truthful reporting strategy is the
identity map i : Si ! Si with i(si) = si. Thus, both i(a;s i;i(si)) = i(a;s) and
i(a;s i;i(si)) = i(a;s).10 The space of pure deviations for i is therefore Ai  Ri.
For every player i and every deviation (bi;i), the conditional probability that signal






When all other players are honest and obedient, the utility to i from deviating to













a i (a) > 0 is the probability that ai was recommended.
A team's metering problem is to nd a contract (;) that makes incentive compatible
obeying recommended behavior as well as honest reporting of monitoring signals.
This is captured by the following family of inequalities.
8i 2 I;ai 2 Ai;(bi;i) 2 Ai  Ri;
X
a i
(a)(vi(a i;bi)   vi(a)) 
X
(a i;s)
(a)i(a;s)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sja i;bi;i)): ()
The left-hand side re
ects the deviation gain in terms of utility11 for a player i from
playing bi when asked to play ai. The right-hand side re
ects his contractual loss
from deviating to (bi;i) relative to honesty and obedience (i.e., playing ai after being
10We will often use the notation s = (s i;si) and a = (a i;ai) for any i, where si 2 Si and
s i 2 S i =
Q
j6=i Sj; similarly for A i.
11Specically, in terms of probability weighted utility, weighted by (ai). If ai is never recom-
mended then (ai) = 0 and both sides of the inequality equal zero.
10asked to do so and reporting according to i). Such a loss originates from two sources.
On the one hand, playing bi instead of ai may change conditional probabilities over
signals. On the other, reporting according to i may aect conditional payments.
Denition 1. A correlated strategy  is exactly enforceable (or simply enforceable)
if there exists an incentive scheme  : I AS ! R to satisfy () for all (i;ai;bi;i).




i(a;s) = 0: ()
A correlated strategy  is approximately enforceable if there exists a sequence of
contracts f(m;m)g such that (m;m) satises () for every m 2 N and m ! .
Call  approximately enforceable with budget balance if it is approximately enforceable
and m satises () for all m.
A correlated strategy is approximately enforceable if it is the limit of exactly enforce-
able ones. Approximate enforcement with budget balance requires that the budget
be balanced along the way, not just asymptotically. For example, in Robinson and
Friday (Section 2.1) the correlated strategy [(shirk,work)] is approximately enforce-
able but not enforceable. In the secret principal (Section 2.2), everybody working
is approximately enforceable with budget balance, but not exactly enforceable with
budget balance, although it is exactly enforceable (without budget balance).
Before solving the model, a little more notation will be useful. A deviation plan
for any player i is a map i : Ai ! (Ai  Ri), where i(bi;ijai) stands for the
probability that i deviates to (bi;i) when recommended to play ai. Given  2 (A),
let Pr() 2 RS be the vector dened by Pr()(s) =
P
a (a)Pr(sja). Intuitively,
Pr() is the expected vector of report probabilities if everyone is honest and obediently








be the expected vector of probabilities if player i deviates from  according to i.
A deviation plan i is disobedient if i(i;bijai) > 0 for some ai 6= bi, i.e., it disobeys
some recommendation ai with positive probability. A disobedient deviation plan may
be \honest," i.e., i may equal i with probability one after every recommendation.
Although dishonesty is arguably a form of disobedience, it will be useful in the sequel
to distinguish between them.
113.1 Detection
Denition 2 (Detection). A deviation plan i for player i is called undetectable if
8 2 (A); Pr() = Pr(;i):
Call i detectable if it is not undetectable, i.e., Pr() 6= Pr(;i) for some  2 (A).
Intuitively, a deviation plan i is undetectable if the probability of reported signals
induced by i, Pr(;i), coincides with that arising from honesty and obedience,
Pr(), regardless of the team's correlated strategy, , assuming that others are honest
and obedient. Detectability is a weak requirement. Undetectable deviation plans
may be dened equivalently by Pr(a) = Pr(a;i) for every a 2 A due to linearity,
but it seems to be a less intuitive description of detectability, albeit more tractable.12
Denition 3 (DUD). A monitoring technology Pr detects unilateral disobedience
(DUD) if every disobedient deviation plan is detectable.
DUD is intuitively dened. Formally, note that dierent correlated strategies may
be used to decide whether or not dierent disobedient deviation plans are detectable.
This is one important aspect that renders DUD substantially weaker than other
conditions in the literature. A detailed comparison will be made shortly, but rst let
us characterize DUD in terms of approximate enforceability.
Denition 4 (PSI). A monitoring technology Pr provides strict incentives (PSI) if





with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi.
If the left-hand side above is interpreted as a player's deviation gain from playing bi
when recommended to play ai, then PSI implies that for any given deviation gains
by the players, there is an incentive scheme such that any deviator's contractual loss
outweighs his deviation gain after every recommendation. It may appear that PSI is
a rather strong condition on a monitoring technology, in contrast with the weakness
of DUD argued below (Example 1). As it turns out, both conditions are equivalent,
in fact mutually dual.
12For a dierently tractable version of DUD (without using reporting strategies), see Lemma B.1.
12Theorem 1. A monitoring technology detects unilateral disobedience if and only if it
provides strict incentives.
Proof. By the Alternative Theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 22.2, p. 198), a given
monitoring technology Pr fails to provide strict incentives if and only if there exists




i(ai;bi;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sja i;bi;i)) = 0:















i) > 0; and
[(ai;i)](bi;i) otherwise (where [] denotes Dirac measure).
By construction, i is disobedient and undetectable: DUD fails. 
This proof describes the duality between identiability and enforceability via secret
contracts. The next result, which may be viewed as a corollary, characterizes DUD
as the weakest identiability required for any action to be approximately enforceable.
Corollary 1. A monitoring technology detects unilateral disobedience if and only if
any team with any prole of utility functions can approximately enforce any correlated
strategy with secret contracts.
Corollary 1 is proved in Appendix A with two mutually dual linear programs. The
primal problem chooses a contract to fulll some given objective subject to incentive
compatibility.13 Its dual problem has contracts as multipliers and chooses unde-
tectable deviation plans. This motivates Denition 3 as a \backward-engineering"
exercise: what minimal requirement on a monitoring technology yields multipliers on
incentive constraints equal to zero (i.e., incentive constraints do not bind)?
When can secret (i.e., recommendation-contingent) contracts add value over and
above standard ones? In other words, when can secret contracts approximately en-
force more action proles than standard ones? To motivate, consider an example.




but this constraint would not bind, since adding a constant to any  preserves its incentive properties.
13Example 1. There are two publicly veriable signals, S = S0 = fx;yg, and two
players, I = f1;2g. Player 1 has two actions, A1 = fU;Dg, and player 2 has three
actions, A2 = fL;M;Rg. The conditional probability system Pr is given below.
L M R
U 1, 0 0, 1 1=2, 1=2
D 0, 1 1, 0 1=3, 2=3
Pr(U;R) clearly lies in the convex hull of Pr(U;L) and Pr(U;M). Intuitively, there is
a mixed deviation (namely 1
2[L]+ 1
2[M], where [] stands for Dirac measure) by player
2 such that the conditional probability over signals is indistinguishable from what it
would be if he played R. In fact, a similar phenomenon takes place when player 1
plays D (this time with mixed deviation 2
3[L] + 1
3[M]) or indeed regardless of player
1's mixed strategy. It is therefore impossible to even approximately enforce R with
transfers contingent only on signals if player 2 strictly prefers playing L and M, since
there always exists a protable deviation without any contractual losses.
However, Pr detects unilateral disobedience, so by Corollary 1 the prole (U;R) can
be approximately enforced even if R is strictly dominated by both L and M. By
correlating player 2's payment with player 1's recommendation, secret contracts can
keep player 2 from knowing the proportion with which he ought to mix between L and
M in order for his contractual payment to equal what he would obtain by playing R.
This suggests how secret contracts can extract more information from a monitoring
technology to provide incentives, even with publicly veriable signals.
In general, the limited scope of standard contracts is characterized below. Given
 2 (A), a monitoring technology Pr detects unilateral disobedience at  (DUD-)
if Pr() 6= Pr(;i) for every player i and every disobedient deviation plan i.
Corollary 2. Fix any monitoring technology Pr. Any team with any prole of utility
functions can approximately enforce any correlated strategy with just signal-contingent
contracts if and only if for every correlated strategy  there is a sequence fmg of
correlated strategies such that m !  and Pr satises DUD-m for all m 2 N.
With secret contracts, dierent correlated strategies may be used to detect dierent
deviation plans, whereas with standard contracts, the same correlated strategy must
detect all deviation plans by all players in order to characterize approximate enforce-
ment. For instance, in Example 1 there is no sequence fmg of correlated strategies
converging to [(U;R)] with Pr satisfying DUD-m for all m, yet DUD holds.
14Let us relate DUD to the literature. If monitoring is publicly veriable (i.e., Si is a
singleton for all i 6= 0), DUD reduces to the following convex independence (CI):
8(i;ai); Pr(ai) = 2 convfPr(bi) : bi 6= aig in R
A iS;
where Pr(bi) 2 RA iS is given by Pr(bi)(a i;s) = Pr(sja i;bi) and \conv" stands for
convex hull. This is substantially weaker than the following condition, call it exact
convex independence (ECI), where Pr(a) 2 RS is dened by Pr(a)(s) = Pr(sja):
8(i;a); Pr(a) = 2 convfPr(a i;bi) : bi 6= aig in R
S:
ECI means that signal probabilities conditional on any action prole change with ev-
ery (mixed) unilateral deviation. In Section 4.2 it is shown that ECI is necessary and
sucient to exactly enforce any correlated strategy (without budget-balance). CI is
substantially weaker than ECI, since CI is necessary and sucient to approximately
enforce any correlated strategy (Corollary 1). Formally, both CI and ECI require
certain vectors to lie outside some convex hull. For CI, the vectors have dimension
A i  S, while for ECI they only have dimension S. Intuitively, CI requires that
every deviation plan be detectable, allowing for dierent correlated strategies to de-
tect dierent deviations, whereas ECI requires detectability with the same correlated
strategy across all deviations and players.
Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Legros and Matthews (1993) provide conditions
equivalent to ECI (but dierently interpreted) and establish exact enforcement with
standard contracts. In repeated games, and to prove folk theorems, individual full
rank (IFR) has been prominent in the literature with public monitoring (Fudenberg
et al., 1994). Formally, IFR (at some ) means that Pr() = 2 linfPr(;bi) : bi 6= aig
for every i, where \lin" stands for linear span. Arguably, the spirit of IFR (and how
it is used in practice) is to detect deviations away from some prescribed , i.e., ECI
at : Pr() = 2 convfPr(;bi) : bi 6= aig for every i. Clearly, IFR implies ECI, but not
conversely. If jSj < jAij for some i then this holds trivially, since IFR is impossible yet
ECI is possible (e.g., all the points on a circle are convexly independent). This holds













2) are convexly independent but linearly dependent). CI is
also weaker than local individual full rank (LIFR) of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet
(1998), which requires IFR at some , possibly dierent for each i.14 This is true
even in spirit, as Example 1 shows, since even \local ECI" fails there.
14For CI, every deviation plan can be detected with dierent correlated strategies for each plan,
whereas LIFR uses the same correlated strategy across deviation plans, though not across players.
15DUD is still weak even if monitoring is not veriable. It is weaker than generalizations
of IFR in Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Obara (2005) and Tomala
(2005)15 used to prove folk theorems with private monitoring (and communication),
as well as a condition by Obara (2006) in mechanism design (Lemma B.2).
We conclude this section by establishing genericity of DUD. Given a player with at
least two observations, there must be at least as many action-signal pairs for others
as for that player. Given a player without observations to report, genericity requires
slightly fewer action-signal pairs for others: at least as many action-signal pairs for
others with one signal omitted as actions for that player with one action omitted.
Theorem 2. DUD is generic if and only if jAi  Sij  jA i  S ij for every i such
that jSij > 1 and jAij   1  jA ij  (jS ij   1) for every i such that jSij = 1.
Proof. For necessity, by Lemma B.2, DUD is implied by convex independence (CI):
8(i;ai;si); Pr(ai;si) = 2 convfPr(bi;ti) : (bi;ti) 6= (ai;si)g:
In turn, CI is implied by linear independence, or full row rank, for all i, of the matrix
with jAi  Sij rows, jA i  S ij columns and entries Pr(ai;si)(a i;s i) = Pr(sja).
Since the set of full rank matrices is generic, if jSij > 1 then this is satised generically
when jAi  Sij  jA i  S ij. If jSij = 1, then adding with respect to s i for each
a i yields column vectors equal to (1;:::;1) 2 RAi. Therefore, there are A i   1
linearly dependent columns. Eliminating them, it follows that genericity requires
jAij = jAi  Sij  jA i  S ij   (jA ij   1) = 1 + jA ij  (jS ij   1):
This must hold for all i. Since the intersection of nitely many generic sets is generic,
necessity follows. For a proof of suciency, see Appendix A. 
If jSj = 1 then DUD is generic only if jAj = 1. More interestingly, DUD is generic
even if jSj = 2, as long as players have enough actions. Hence, a team may overcome
incentive constraints (i.e., Corollary 1 holds) generically even if only one individual is
able to make substantive observations and these observations are just a simple binary
bit of information. If others' action spaces are large enough and their actions have
generic eect on the bit's probability, this uniquely informed individual could still be
controlled by testing him with unpredictable combinations of others' actions.16
15Here, detection is dened with respect to the same correlated strategy for each deviation plan.
16We thank an anonymous referee for urging us to emphasize this point.
163.2 Attribution
Denition 5 (Attribution). A deviation plan i for player i is unattributable if
there exists a prole  i = (1;:::;i 1;i+1;:::;n) of deviation plans such that
8 2 (A); Pr(;1) =  = Pr(;i) =  = Pr(;n):
Call i attributable if it is not unattributable, i.e., for every prole  i of deviation
plans, there is a correlated strategy  and a player j such that Pr(;i) 6= Pr(;j).
Intuitively, a deviation plan is unattributable if there exists a prole of opponents'
deviation plans such that every unilateral deviation would lead to the same expected
report probabilities. Heuristically, after an unattributable unilateral deviation, even
if the fact that someone deviated is detected, anyone could have been the culprit.
Denition 6 (IOP). A monitoring technology Pr identies obedient players (IOP)
if every disobedient deviation plan is attributable.
IOP is a stronger requirement on a monitoring technology than DUD. Indeed, DUD
follows by replacing j above with honesty and obedience. IOP means that any
prole of disobedient deviation plans that aects the probability of reported signals
must do so in a way that is dierent for some players, since otherwise they would be
unattributable. Conversely, if IOP fails then there exist disobedient deviation plans
that change conditional probabilities in the same way for every player, so anyone
could have disobeyed. Budget-balanced implementation must therefore fail, since
players' incentives would \overlap." In other words, it would be impossible to punish
some and reward others at the same time in order to provide adequate incentives. If
all players must be punished or rewarded together, then budget balance must fail.
In comparison with Holmstr om (1982), who appointed a principal to play the role
of budget-breaker, it will be seen that a team whose monitoring technology exhibits
IOP can share that role internally. In some teams, this might be allocated stochas-
tically, even leading to a secret principal (Section 2.2). Indeed, Holmstr om (1982)'s
principal works because after a unilateral deviation, the principal (having no actions
to take) can be identied as an obedient player, i.e., obedience is `attributable' to the
principal. Heuristically, IOP emphasizes rewarding the innocent rather than punish-
ing the guilty. Furthermore, Corollary 3 below argues that the former perspective on
incentives delivers informational economies relative to the latter.
17Theorem 3. A monitoring technology identies obedient players if and only if it
provides strict incentives with budget balance, i.e., there exists a probability weighted
incentive scheme  : I  A  S ! R such that
P





with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi.
Proof. By the Alternative Theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 22.2, p. 198), Pr
fails to provide strict incentives with budget balance if and only if there exist vectors




i(ai;bi;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sja i;bi;i)) = (a;s);
where  is independent of i. Let  = max(i;ai)
P
(bi;i) i(ai;bi;i) > 0. For every
player i, let i be the deviation plan dened pointwise by
i(bi;ijai) :=
(




By construction, i is disobedient and unattributable (using  i): IOP fails. 
Corollary 3. A monitoring technology identies obedient players if and only if any
team with any prole of utility functions can approximately enforce any correlated
strategy with budget balanced secret contracts.
The proof of this result is almost identical to that of Corollary 1, therefore omitted.
The only dierence is that the primal includes (), yielding a slightly dierent dual.




where 0 stands for the origin of RAS and for every i, Ci (called the cone of player i)





Call this condition on fCig non-overlapping cones (NOC). Fudenberg et al. (1994)
impose a full rank condition for each pair of players at each action prole, implying
18that certain hyperplanes intersect only at the origin for every pair of players. On
the other hand, NOC requires that certain cones intersect only at the origin for all
players. Thus, it is possible that two players' cones overlap, i.e., their intersection
is larger than just the origin. In general, NOC does not even require that there
always be two players whose cones fail to overlap, in contrast with the compatibility
condition of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998), as Figure 1 below illustrates.17
Figure 1: A cross-section of three non-overlapping cones in R3 (pointed at the origin
behind the page) such that every pair of cones overlaps.
Upon a unilateral disobedience that changes probabilities by DUD, although it may
be impossible to identify deviator(s), there must be someone to who could not have
generated the statistical change. This way, IOP identies obedient players. Budget
balanced incentives are now possible, rewarding the obedient and punishing all others.
Just as for DUD, IOP can be translated to an equivalent condition with dual economic
interpretation. The condition is PSI with budget balance, and its equivalence to IOP
follows by the same argument as for DUD and PSI. Specically for (publicly) veriable
monitoring, the fact that IOP can be decomposed into two separate conditions, DUD
and NOC, provides useful insights, as shown next.
Denition 7. A veriable monitoring technology Pr clears every budget (CEB) if









The function K(a;s) may be regarded as a budgetary surplus or decit for each
combination of recommended action and realized signal. CEB means that any level
17IOP is weaker than pairwise full rank, local pairwise full rank, and compatibility of d'Aspremont
and G erard-Varet (1998) also in the sense of approximate versus exact implementation (as well as
information extraction), like DUD versus (local) individual full rank in Example 1.
19of such budgetary surplus or decit can be attained by a team without disrupting
any incentive compatibility constraints. As it turns out, this is equivalent to NOC.
Proposition 1. A veriable monitoring technology has non-overlapping cones if and
only if it clears every budget.
This result further claries the relative roles of DUD and NOC. By Theorem 1, DUD
characterizes approximate enforceability of any action prole a by secret contract.
However, the team's budget may not be balanced ex post. NOC guarantees existence
of a further contract to absorb any budgetary decit or surplus of the original contract
without violating any incentive constraints. Therefore, the original contract plus this
further contract can now approximately enforce a with ex post budget balance.18
Without veriability, a decomposition of IOP into two separate parts does not emerge
naturally. Indeed, it is not dicult to see that NOC plus DUD is sucient but not
necessary for IOP. To see this, notice there exist deviations, namely dishonest but
obedient ones, that do not directly aect anyone's utility, and as such IOP allows
them to remain unattributable (like DUD). With veriability, every deviation may
in principle aect players directly.
Example 2. Suppose there exists an individual i0 such that Ai0 and Si0 are both
singleton sets. Here, DUD suces for approximate implementability with ex post
budget balance for this team, since player i0 cannot be a deviator. She may become
a \principal" and serve as \budget-breaker," much like a seller in an auction.
Example 3. Consider a team with two players (I = f1;2g) and two publicly veriable
signals (S = S0 = fx;yg). The players play the normal-form game (left) with public
monitoring technology (right) below:
w s2 w s2
m 2; 1  1;0 m p;1   p q;1   q
s1 3; 1 0;0 s1 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
Suppose that q > p > 1=2. First we will show that the \desirable" prole (s1;w)
cannot even be implemented approximately with standard (i.e., non-secret) contracts.
With any standard contract, player 1 must be indierent between monitoring and
18A similar argument is provided by d'Aspremont et al. (2004) for Bayesian mechanisms.
20shirking to approximate eciency (it can be shown that player 2's randomization
does not help). This implies that 1 = 1
4(1(x)   1(y)), where 1(!) is the transfer
to player 1 when ! 2 fx;yg realizes. Budget balance requires 1 = 1
4(2(y)   2(x)).
Since player 2's incentive constraint is 1   1
4(2(y)   2(x)), where  denotes the
probability that player 1 plays m, it follows that  cannot be smaller than 1.
There exist budget-balanced secret contracts that approximately implement (s1;w).
Indeed, let player 1 play m with any probability  > 0 and player 2 play w with
probability 1. Let  : A  S ! R denote monetary transfers to player 1 from player
2, and x (a;s) = 0 for all (a;s) except (m;w;x). That is, no money is transferred at
all except when (m;w) is recommended and x realizes. Clearly, s1 and s2 are incentive
compatible when recommended. The remaining incentive constraints simplify to:




2   p)(m;w;x)  0
w : 1 +
(m;w)
(w)
(p   q)(m;w;x)  0
These two inequalities can clearly be satised by taking (m;w;x) large enough. It is
not dicult to check that IOP is satised (hence also DUD) if and only if p 6= q and
(p 1=2)(q 1=2) > 0. Thus, Robinson and Friday (Section 2.1) cannot approximately
enforce (s1;w) with budget balance.
Example 4. Without veriability (S = S1 = fx;yg) IOP fails, but the same con-
dition suces to approximately enforce (s1;w) with budget balance. However, not
everything is approximately enforceable. See Section 4.2 for conditions on a moni-
toring technology to approximately enforce a given action prole.
Finally, we establish genericity.
Proposition 2. IOP is generic if also
 A fi;jg  S fi;jg
   jAi  Sij + jAj  Sjj   1
for some i;j 2 I.
Proof. 
214 Discussion
This section makes four comments. Firstly, it lls an important gap in the inter-
pretation of Theorems 1 and 3. Secondly, it reconciles our main results with the
literature by applying the duality of our model to the case of xed action proles and
utility functions. Thirdly, environmental complications such as limited liability and
individual rationality are examined, where standard results generalize to our setting
easily, such as that only total liability matters to a team or that individual rationality
is not a binding constraint. We end the section by arguing that DUD and IOP, as
well as similar variants, are generic in relatively low dimensional spaces.
4.1 Exact versus Approximate Enforcement
A correlated strategy  is (exactly) implementable if there is a scheme  such that
8i 2 I;ai 2 Ai;i 2 i;
X
a i
(a)(vi(bi;a i)   vi(a)) 
X
(a i;s)
(a)i(a;s)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)): (  )
In Section ??, approximate implementability is dened in terms of linear inequalities:
 is approximately implementable if a  exists such that (;) satises (). To justify,
it must be shown that (;) is approachable: there is a sequence f(m;m)g such that
(m;m) satises () for every m, m ! , and mm ! . The next result proves
this under DUD and IOP. In addition, IOP implies every action prole is approachable
with contracts that are budget balanced \along the way," not just asymptotically.
Proposition 3. Pr satises DUD (IOP) only if every completely mixed correlated
strategy is implementable (with budget balance). Hence, DUD (IOP) implies that
every contract satisfying () (and ()) is approachable (with budget balance).
When DUD or IOP fails, the \closure" of (  ) does not necessarily equal (). To
illustrate, consider the following variation of Robinson and Friday (Section 2.1):
work shirk rest work shirk rest
monitor 2; 1  1;0  1;0 monitor 1;0 0;1 1;0
shirk 3; 1 0;0 0; 1 shirk 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
22Assume the signal is public. The prole (shirk,work) is approximately implementable
with transfers  given by F(gjmonitor,work) = 1 and i(a;s) = 0 for other (i;a;s).
However, since rest is indistinguishable from work and rest weakly dominates work,
no contract can dissuade Friday from resting. Hence, (shirk,work) is not approach-
able. Generalizing Proposition 3 involves iterated elimination of weakly dominated
indistinguishable strategies in the spirit of Myerson's (1997) dual reduction; details
are left for another paper. (But Theorem 4 below provides a partial generalization.)
4.2 Fixed Action Proles and Utility Functions
A characterization of implementable action proles also follows. We focus on budget
balanced implementation (without proof, since it is just like that of Theorem 3); the
unbalanced case|being similar|is omitted.
A mixed deviation i 2 (i) for player i is unattributable at a 2 A if there is
a prole of mixed deviations  such that Pr(i;a) = Pr(j;a) for every j, where
Pr(i;a)(s) =
P
i i(i)Pr(sji;a i) for every s; otherwise it is attributable at a.
Say Pr identies obedient players at a (IOP-a) if every mixed deviation i with
i(i;bi) > 0 for some bi 6= ai is attributable at a.
Proposition 4. A monitoring technology identies obedient players at an action
prole a if and only if any team with any prole of utility functions can exactly
implement a with budget balanced secret contracts.
With veriable monitoring, IOP-a can be decomposed into two conditions. The rst
is exact convex independence at a (ECI-a), which means that the requirement for ECI
from Section 3.1 holds at a. For the second, let Ci(a) be the cone of player i at a,
i.e., the set of all vectors  2 RS such that for some mixed deviation i,








IOP-a is equivalent to ECI-a and NOC-a. It generalizes the famous pairwise full rank
condition of Fudenberg et al. (1994), and implies (but is not implied by) for all i 6= j,
Ci(a) \ Cj(a) = f0g:
23Intuitively, i's and j's deviations can be statistically distinguished at a. On the other
hand, NOC-a allows some players' cones to overlap. Naturally, this is weaker than
pairwise full rank at a, and generally even weaker than Ci(a)\Cj(a) = f0g for some
i;j. Intuitively, NOC-a requires that some player can be identied as obedient at a.19
It is possible to partially generalize Proposition 3 by xing utility functions. To this
end, a deviation plan i for i is vi-detectable if Pr() = Pr(i;) for every correlated





(a;i) vi(bi;a i)i(ijai)(a). Pr v-detects unilateral disobedience (v-DUD)
if every disobedient deviation plan i of any player i is vi-detectable. Similarly, call i
v-attributable if existence of a prole  of deviation plans with Pr(i;) = Pr(j;)
for every  and every j implies that
P
i vi(i;) vi()  0. Pr v-identies obedient
players (v-IOP) if every disobedient deviation plan is v-attributable.
The next result follows immediately from the duality of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3,
so its proof is omitted. It could also be extended to describe exact implementability
in line with Proposition 4 after suitably amending v-DUD/v-IOP; details are left to
the reader.
Theorem 4. A monitoring technology exhibits v-DUD (v-IOP) if and only if any
action prole is approximately implementable with (budget balanced) secret contracts.
Furthermore, Proposition 3 still holds with v-DUD (v-IOP) replacing DUD (IOP).
4.3 Participation and Liability
In this subsection we will use duality to study teams subject to liquidity constraints.
One such constraint is limited liability, where an individual's transfers are bounded
below. This can be taken into account by adding i(a;s)  `i or i(a;s)  (a)`i
to the metering problem, where `i is an exogenous parameter representing player i's
liability. Let ` = (`1;:::;`n) be the prole of liabilities faced by a team. A team's
total liability is dened by b ` =
P
i `i. By a simple duality and without restrictions
on a team's monitoring technology, we can generalize to our setting Theorem 5 of
Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Theorem 4 of Legros and Matthews (1993).
19Restricted to public monitoring, Proposition 4 is equivalent to Proposition 3 in Legros and
Matsushima (1991). Similar results are also in Lemma 1 of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998),
but our decomposition and interpretation are new. Indeed, IOP-a is weaker than their compatibility,
which requires pairwise full rank for some pair of players.
24Proposition 5. Only total liability aects a team's (approximately) implementable
action proles (with and without budget balance).
It is possible that the team faces double-sided limited liability, which may be captured
by adding a version of the following constraints to the metering problem:
8(i;a;s);  (a)`i  i(a;s)  (a)`i;
for some `i  0. These constraints lead to an alternative, linear way of requiring that
 be adapted to  (i.e., i(a;s) = 0 whenever (a) = 0).
Individual rationality is also amenable to our study of incentives. Without budget
balance, since players can be paid lump sums to become indierent between belonging
to the team and forsaking it, individual rationality constraints cannot bind. Hence,
suppose the team's budget must be balanced ex post. As a normalization, assume
that
P








Proposition 6. Participation is not a binding constraint if
P
i vi(a)  0 for all a.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored possible ways in which secret contracts may help
organizations, with particular emphasis on the question of monitoring a monitor and
maintaining budget balance. Formally, we have used duality systematically to make
general statements about a team's contractual scope. We have exploited this duality
to consider teams with innitely many actions and signals, with fruitful applications
such as a subdierential characterization equilibrium payos. Below, we conclude
this paper with some comments to connect the paper with the (mechanism design
and implementation) literature, discuss weaknesses (collusion), and further research.
5.1 Abstract Mechanisms in Concrete Contracts
We build a bridge between abstract mechanism design and concrete contract theory in
this paper. Some of the mechanism design literature has focused on surplus extraction
25in environments with adverse selection. Thus, Cremer and McLean (1988) argued
that if individuals have \correlated types" then their surplus may be extracted.20 On
the other hand, they do not explain the source of such correlation. Secret contracts
provide an explanation for the emergence of correlated types.
As part of a team's economic organization, it may be benecial for private information
to be allocated dierently in order to provide the right incentives. As has been argued
here, this is true even if the team starts without informational asymmetry. In a sense,
correlated types emerge endogenously, and as such there are incidental similarities
between this paper and the mechanism design literature even if conceptually there
are important dierences. For instance, the essence of secret contracts is lost in the
abstraction of mechanism design because it so reduced. With moral hazard, our
identiability conditions apparently lend themselves easily to interpretation.
Nonetheless, a hybrid exercise where players begin with some private information and
face an additional metering problem is amenable to the techniques developed here.
Initial results are promising (Rahman, 2005b, Ch. 5); details are for another paper.
5.2 Secrets and Veriable Recommendations
Secret contracts rely on making payments contingent on veriable recommendations.
Even if the mediator's messages are unveriable, it may still be possible for players
to veriably reveal their recommendations. Player i's reporting strategy would then
involve announcing a recommended action and a private signal. Incentive constraints
would be only slightly dierent.
Kandori (2003) used similar schemes in Nash equilibrium for repeated games with
public monitoring, by having players mix independently and transfers depend on
reported realizations of mixed strategies. Our framework is more general because we
study private monitoring with communication in correlated equilibrium. Moreover,
we do not require pairwise conditions on the monitoring technology for a folk theorem.
As illustrated by Robinson and Friday in Section 2.1, secret contracts provide an
intuitive organizational design. If recommendations were not veriable, then in order
to approximate eciency Friday would need to report whether or not he worked,
20d'Aspremont et al. (2004) extend this result to include budget balance. The additional constraint
of individual rationality is studied by Kosenok and Severinov (2004).
26which broadly interpreted provides a dierent answer to the question of monitoring
the monitor: have two monitors monitoring each other. We purposely avoided this.
5.3 Usual Problems with Collusion
[Discuss the model with multilateral deviations.]
A notable weakness of secret contracts is not being collusion-proof. To illustrate, in
our leading example (Section 2.1) Robinson and Friday could communicate to break
down the incentives that secrets tried to provide. However, this problem is neither
inherent to secrets nor widespread to all teams. Example 3 describes when Robinson
and Friday can approximate eciency with budget balance, for which they require
secrets. There, contracts are naturally robust to collusion, since budget balance
implies that Friday's gain is Robinson's loss.
Collusion is a problem for secret contracts inasmuch as it is a problem for contracts
in general. For instance, the transfer schemes of Cremer and McLean (1988) are
not generally collusion-proof for similar reasons. In any case, although there may be
partial solutions to the problem of collusion with secret contracts in the spirit of, say,
Che and Kim (2006), the main purpose of this paper is to introduce secret contracts.
Thus, analysis of collusion is postponed for the future. Meanwhile, the scheme below
weakly dissuades extra-contractual communication between Robinson and Friday.
(monitor,work) (monitor,shirk) (shirk,work) (shirk,shirk)
g 1=;1= 0;1= 1=2;0 0;1=2(1   )
b 0;0 1=(1   );0 0;1=(1   ) 1=2(1   );1=2(1   )
A Proofs



























i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) = 0
Clearly,  is feasible if and only if its probabilistic normalization is undetectable. We will
show that DUD is equivalent to Vf(v) = maxff(a) : a 2 Ag for all f. If Pr satises DUD
then by the second family of dual constraints, any feasible  6= 0 must have i(ai;i) > 0
only if ai = bi. Hence, the rst family of dual constraints becomes   f(a) for all a.
Minimizing  subject to them yields maxff(a) : a 2 Ag for any f and v, proving suciency.
For necessity, if DUD fails there is   0 with
X
i2i
i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) = 0
for all (i;a;s) and j(b aj; b j) > 0 for some (j;b aj; b j) with b bj 6= b aj. Let f = 1b aj and choose v
as follows. For any a j, the utility to each player depending on whether or not j plays b aj
is given by (rst is j then anyone else):
aj b aj
1, 0 0, 2
Given a with aj 6= b aj, the rst dual constraint becomes 0+
P
j (aj;b aj;j)  . This can
be made smaller than 1 by multiplying  by a suciently small positive number. At b aj, the
constraint becomes 1  
P
j j(b aj;j)  . Since
P
 > 0, there is a feasible dual solution
with  < 1 = maxff(a)g, as required. 
















i(ai;bi)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sjbi;a i)) = (a;s):
If CEB is satised, then the value of the primal equals 0 for any K : AS ! R. By FTLP,
the value of the dual is also 0 for any K : A  S ! R. Therefore, any  satisfying the
constraint for some  must be 0 for all (a;s), so NOC is satised. For necessity, if NOC is
satised then the value of the dual is always 0 for any K : AS ! R. By FTLP, the value
of the primal is also 0 for any K. Therefore, given K, there is a feasible primal solution
i(a;s) that satises all the primal constraints, and CEB is satised. 
28Proposition 3. For B  A, the B-cone generated by unidentiable deviation proles is
K(B) := f  0 : 8i 2 I;a 2 B;s 2 S;
X
i2i
i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) = 0g:
By the Alternative Theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, p. 198), a given  is implementable, i.e.,
there exists  to solve (  ), if and only if the following dual inequalities are satised:






(a)(vi(bi;a i)   vi(a))  0:
In contrast, approximate implementability of  as in Denition 1 is equivalent to the smaller
system of inequalities indexed instead by  2 K(A)  K(supp ). (Hence, exact imple-
mentability implies approximate.) Now, if  is completely mixed then (a) > 0 for all a,
so K(supp ) = K(A). By DUD, K(A) consists of all   0 with i(ai;i) > 0 implying




a i (a)(vi(bi;a i)   vi(a)) = 0,
and implementability follows. For IOP, replacing K(B) with
K0(B) := f  0 : 8i 2 I;a 2 B;s 2 S;
X
i2i
i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) = (a;s)g
leads to the corresponding result by an almost identical argument.
Clearly, the closure of the space of contracts satisfying () (and ()) is contained in the
space of contracts satisfying () (and ()), so it remains only to show the converse con-
tainment. To this end, pick any (;) satisfying () (and ()). By the previous argument,
the uniformly distributed correlated strategy with full support 0 = (1=jAj;:::;1=jAj)
is implementable (with budget balance). For any sequence of positive probabilities fpmg
decreasing to 0, consider the sequence of contracts f(m;m)g dened for every (i;a;s) by
m(a) = pm0(a) + (1   pm)(a) and m
i (a;s) = pm0
i (a;s) + (1   pm)i(a;s)=m(a). This
sequence of contracts converges to (;) and satises (  ) (as well as ()) for all m. 
Proposition 5. We just prove the result with budget balance; the rest follows similarly.
The dual of the metering problem of maximizing
P
a f(a)(a) subject to limited liability,




8a 2 A;   f(a)  
X
(i;i)







i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) + i(a;s) = (a;s);
where i(a;s) is a multiplier on the liquidity constraint for player i at (a;s). Adding the last














29where b ` =
P




8a 2 A;   f(a)  
X
(i;i)







i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i))  (a;s):
Any two liability proles ` and `0 with b ` = b `0 lead to this same dual with the same value. 




8a 2 A;   f(a)  
X
(i;i)




8(i;a;s); i Pr(sja) +
X
i2i
i(ai;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sji;a i)) = (a;s)
where i is a multiplier for player i's participation constraint. Adding the second family
of dual constraints with respect to s 2 S, it follows that i =  does not depend on i.
Redening (a;s) as (a;s)    Pr(sja), the set of all feasible   0 is the same as without
participation constraints. Since
P
i vi(a)  0 for all a, the dual is minimized by  = 0. 
Suciency in Theorem 2. For suciency, suppose rstly that jSij > 1 yet jAi  Sij >




i) = (1=jSj;:::;1=jSj). For all
other (ai;si),
[A proof of genericity via convex independence: if there are more points than dimensions
(i.e., more rows than columns) then have all the vertices be one of the points. Then
have another point (there's at least one left over by assumption) be the equally weighted
average of all the vertices. Any remaining points can go anywhere. Clearly there is convex
dependence. A small perturbation of all the points preserves convex dependence, so there
is an open set of monitoring technologies with convex dependence. But an open set has
positive Lebesgue measure. Therefore, SCI is generic if jSj > 1 and there are at least as
many columns as rows.]

Corollary 2. By the Alternative Theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 22.2, p. 198), for
any correlated strategy , Pr satises DUD- if and only if there exists a signal contingent





with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi. Therefore, by scaling  appropriately, any devia-
tion gains can be outweighed by contractual losses. The result now follows. 
B Lemmata





then i(bi;tijai;si) = 0 whenever ai 6= bi.
Proof.

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